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Succeeding the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), whose main concern had 
been decolonisation, the African Union (AU) began focusing on enhancing 
human security and consolidating democracy. The new Union was faced with 
huge challenges, however. Of 47 Sub-Saharan Africa states that had embarked 
upon democratisation, 42 failed to transform and democratise. Then, early in 
2011, the grassroots in five North African states rose to overthrow their near 
monarchical regimes and succeeded in spreading the initiative into the rest of 
the Arab World. The AU found itself engaged in attempts to resolve complex 
conflict situations, but with the international community as an active participant. 
With limited resources, but boasting political legitimacy over African member 
states, the AU intervened into the various crises with mixed results. It was unable, 
however, to enforce the compelling tools at its disposal – such as mediation 
forums, suspension of membership, withdrawing recognition of legitimacy and 
even imposing sanctions on truant political players and member states. It also 
had to fight a credibility battle as an African organisation not taken seriously, 
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undermined by former colonial powers and marginalised in the international 
security system. This paper, therefore, seeks to make a critical evaluation of four 
AU intervention efforts in situations of blocked political-democratic transitions, 
and to make suggestions on strengthening such efforts and enhancing credibility – 
in the eyes of ordinary Africans and the international community.
Abbreviations
AU  African Union
AUHIP  African Union High Level Implementation Panel
CA  Constitutive Act
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EU  European Union
GNU  Government of National Unity
GPA  Global Political Agreement
HAT  High Transitional Authority – in Madagascar
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICG  International Crisis Group
IMF  International Monetary Fund
NTC  National Transitional Council 
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
SPLA/SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s  
  Liberation Movement
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
WB  World Bank
ZANU (PF) Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZESN         Zimbabwe Election Support Network
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Since July 2000, when the Constitutive Act (CA) was adopted in Lomé, Togo, 
establishing the AU as a successor to the OAU – whose primary objective, since 
May 1963, had been the complete decolonisation of the continent, following the 
events after the 1884 Berlin Conference that had balkanised and divided up the 
continent – a new approach to conflict resolution has been ushered in. This is 
characterised by encouraging member states to create functioning democracies 
and economic prosperity for Africans, by criminalising unconstitutional 
changes of governments and actually banning military coups d’état, and 
finally, by providing the most important innovation in the new era, the right 
of the AU to intervene in a country where atrocities as grave circumstances, war 
crimes or genocide were being inflicted upon civilians. (Constitutive Act of the 
African Union 2000: articles 3 (c), (f), (h) and (k); 4 (d), (h) and (p)). These 
lofty ambitions that form the framework of the AU have laid the foundations 
for transforming the continent towards 2015, in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
When the AU member states adopted the CA, another form of inheritance was 
still in place – one that had deformed the natural progression of the African 
political system even after the residual tendencies of colonialism. This was the 
imposition of the cold-war spheres of influence since the Korean War of 1950–
53, a global security jacket that had imposed itself on weak and developing 
countries’ political systems (BBC 2012). This ended in 1991 when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, allowing parts of the world to chart their own different courses 
of political transformation. It is against these events in the international security 
system that Africa found itself saddled with the stale African political systems 
that were in place, designed to uphold and advance external super-power 
interests rather than those of ordinary Africans. Most were presented as one-
party state systems, creating environments in which dictatorships emerged, 
negating the natural evolution of democratic institutions, norms and practices 
and therefore stifling internal political freedoms and democracy.  
In Egypt, Somalia, the then Zaire and other countries, regimes in power had 
been truncated, transforming the narrow caste of political elites to serve as 
proxies for external powers. In turn, the Mobutu Sese Seko-like regimes enjoyed 
the support of the superpowers, in maintaining the sphere of influence line, 
164
Martin Rupiya
while suppressing and subjugating their own peoples’ political freedoms and 
ambitions. When the oppressive cover of the cold war was lifted, between 1989 
and the early 2000s, 47 Sub-Saharan African states embarked upon economic 
liberalisation to open up trade and investment to global market forces, as 
well as upon political transformation to embrace multiparty democracy. This 
was undertaken under the so-called Washington consensus, championed by 
John Williamson, and supported by the IMF and World Bank amongst others 
(Williamson 1989; Rodrik 2006). This process was perceived and prescribed as 
the necessary but specific policy prescriptions, constituting the ‘standard’ reform 
package for developing countries. 
It is in the implementation of this wide ranging and progressive agenda of the 
AU, in the intervening period of 2000 to 2012, that serious challenges have 
emerged which form the focus of this research in order to ascertain what the AU 
has achieved in the area of facilitating democratic power transfers.
In the last decade, the AU – established as a successor to the OAU whose main 
concern had been decolonisation – has focused on the dual challenges of 
enhancing human security and consolidating democracy. In order to achieve 
this, the AU spent the first part of the decade developing guiding protocols 
before launching itself, operationally, during the second half. 
In 1989, while North Africa remained immune from the winds of democratisation, 
47 Sub-Saharan Africa states embarked upon democratisation, seeking to move 
away from the era of the one-party-state and long-reigning leaders. Within five 
years, 42 states had failed to transform and democratise. Some of the  prominent 
states included the then Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), Somalia, 
Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Madagascar. This confirms Samuel Huntington’s 
assertion of Africa remaining outside his identification of developing states in 
the Third Wave of Democratisation (Huntington 1992; London 1993).
In January 2011, the grassroots in North Africa rose, almost as one, to 
overthrow the near monarchical regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco 
and Libya, succeeding in spreading the initiative into the rest of the Arab World 
(Bassett and Straus 2011).
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Faced with this twin challenge of recalcitrant incumbents, supported by 
partisan institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, succeeding in blocking democratic 
transitions, and the dizzying speed of the collapse of regimes in North Africa, 
the AU found itself engaged in complex conflict resolution crises that had the 
international community as an active participant. In the case of Ivory Coast 
and Libya, the United Nations (UN) passed compelling resolutions, calling for 
armed intervention. For the AU, bereft of any integral forces, armed with a series 
of conflict resolution protocols that are still to be ratified, but boasting political 
legitimacy over any African member state, the organisation has intervened in the 
various crises with mixed results.
Based on the episodic and anecdotal evidence so far, the AU appears deliberately 
weakened, unable to enforce the compelling tools that it has, such as: mediation 
forums, suspension of membership, withdrawing recognition of legitimacy 
and even imposing sanctions on truant political players and member states. 
Meanwhile, the AU is also fighting a credibility battle as an African organisation 
that is not taken seriously, and is continually undermined by former colonial 
powers and marginalised in the international security system.
More recently, the AU has begun to flex its muscles as a recognised continental 
voice from which the international community takes its cue. On 12 April 2012, 
the AU condemned the capture by South Sudan of Heglig (also known in Juba as 
Panthou) in a region considered to be under northern Sudanese jurisdiction. On 
17 April, the AU condemned and suspended the Guinea-Bissau military junta 
that had seized power just before the holding of a presidential election. Earlier, 
on 13 March, the AU had issued a severe reprimand while suspending Mali and 
the coup leader, Captain Amadou Sonogo, for seizing power from an elected 
government merely on account of differences of strategy on how to respond 
to the advancing Touareg rebels and Salafists from the North who had invested 
the towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Much more significantly, the AU led the 
rejection of a new state by well-armed and fast moving rebels, now in charge of 
large parts of Mali, who had declared these areas as the new state of Azawad. In 
the case of Zimbabwe, following the disputed election in March and the 
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subsequent violent presidential run-off of June 2008, the AU Summit in Sharm 
El Sheik passed a resolution calling instead for a shared political authority in 
transitional government under the auspices of the sub-regional body SADC in a 
process that will yet again end up without a free and fair election. 
In Madagascar, the worsening crisis during the first quarter of 2009 witnessed 
the sitting President, Marc Ravalomanana, forced into exile by the military and 
his main adversary, Andry Rajoelina – who then took power and established 
the High Transitional Authority, known as HAT under a French acronym. 
Faced with this development, the AU and SADC reacted, informed by the 1997 
Harare Declaration that banned unconstitutional changes of government. The 
next steps and their impact have been unprecedented, and have demonstrated 
the effectiveness of the combination of an assertive sub-regional body, SADC, 
riding on the back of the well-established and legitimate AU leadership role of 
consolidating democracy on the continent. The impact has been illustrative. 
It is also true that Madagascar is regarded to be within the ‘sphere of influence’ 
of SADC, with 98% of economic trade from South Africa and Mozambique 
transported through the Mozambique channel waters, and with – facetiously, 
against the background of French victory over South African foreign policy in 
the Ivory Coast crisis – greater resolve by the sub-region to impose itself on the 
crisis resolution in Madagascar. 
The first step taken was to suspend Madagascar from both the AU and SADC 
membership but not abandon the fate of the ordinary people to the competitive 
political elites. Hence, in the same breath, both the AU and SADC declared 
ownership of the conflict management and resolution of the crisis, making 
themselves the final certifiers of the resolution through the SADC Road Map to 
which all the actors were invited to participate. Even as this was being announced, 
over 100 members, apparently chosen by Andry Rajoelina to sit on the HAT, 
were targeted with personal sanctions as was the country. The AU and SADC 
were able to convince the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the European Union (EU) and the US special African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) Forum to summarily withdraw aid until the crisis was resolved. 
According to International Crisis Group (ICG) Africa Report 166 of November 
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2010 (ICG 2010), citing the Economic Intelligence Unit, Air Madagascar was 
banned from flying into the SADC and Africa, 40% of foreign direct investment 
was immediately lost, income from tourism was reduced by 50%, and 75% of 
potential investors were scared off from the Island by 2010 or within a year. The 
same Economic Intelligence Unit also provided evidence of an economic spiral 
downwards, with GDP in 2008 of 7% declining by 50% to 3.7% in 2009, 2% in 
2010 and finally edging into the negative territory at 0.6% in 2011. The impact 
of sanctions on the overall economy has been dramatic. With severe shortages 
on the streets, in civil service ranks and even within the private sector, serious 
shortages of commodities and food stuff began to register, and government 
began to default and be unable to meet salaries and other basic commitments.
Late 2009 also witnessed the reach and effectiveness of the continental bodies 
in international diplomacy. Rajoelina, enjoying the tacit support of the French 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy, visited Paris and through this was able to secure 
recognition from Pakistan and Turkey for his government. In September, 
Rajoelina arrived in New York, to attend and address the General Assembly, 
but Angola, the country who was chairing SADC, successfully had Rajoelina 
removed from the UN roster, delivering a decisive and humiliating blow to 
attempts to break ranks with the stated positions on the continent. As we write, 
Madagascar’s parliament has begun to adopt the SADC Road Map into the 
country’s legislation while the leadership has been forced by an assertive and 
determined AU and SADC to re-consider the initial bravado and attempts to 
go it alone.
This research therefore seeks to make a critical evaluation of the AU’s intervention 
efforts in dealing with blocked political-democratic transitions, with a view to 
making suggestions on where and how current efforts can be strengthened in 
order to enhance credibility in the eyes of ordinary Africans and the international 
community. This is distinct from examining current democratic reverses, such 
as in Madagascar, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, where the militaries have seized 
power and the AU has acted swiftly, suspended membership and forced actors to 
seek a constitutional way out. 
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This paper, examining the AU’s role and experience of intervention, is presented 
in chronological sequence, based on date order when the interventions occurred.
Over the last decade, through trial and error, the AU has developed a methodology 
and model for conflict resolution whose impact on each of the diverse case 
studies has been tested. The focus of this paper will therefore be on identifying 
the continuing challenges to the model – with the purpose of informing policy 
makers and perhaps also leading to the further fine tuning of the methodology. 
But what is the methodology that has evolved over the last decade, and that 
the AU – even without substantive authority from member states, but relying 
primarily on its acquired and accrued political legitimacy – is now applying in 
its intervention? 
The AU’s methodology in resolving conflict is characterised by the AU moving 
decisively to occupy and own the process, playing on its now established political 
legitimacy on the continent – suggesting to contending parties that they consider 
entering into a Government of National Unity (GNU); providing a framework 
of legal reforms including constitutional re-writing to appease historical and 
aspirational positions; undertaking legal reforms that may or may not result 
in reforming (discredited) institutions or creating new ones where they do not 
exist; undertaking free and fair elections, opening to UN and other interested 
players opportunities of observation, certification and verification; and finally, 
being involved in the actual transfer of power to entities that are then bestowed 
the AU’s legitimacy.
In assessing the experience and contribution of the AU to conflict resolution on 
the continent over the last decade, only a selected group of countries, including 
Zimbabwe (2008), Ivory Coast (2011), Libya (2011) and Sudan, both North 
and South (2012), is used as examples in this brief case study on intervention. 
Because this is an article in a journal, which provides limited space for extended 
presentations, the discussion below is fairly abbreviated, and concentrates on 
the relationship between tools, impacts and outcomes as a basis to measure the 
experience and relevance of the AU’s intervention in African conflict resolution. 
The hope is to provide a skeletal but common thread that runs through the case 
studies in order to draw lessons for contemporary and future actors.
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Zimbabwe 
The AU’s intervention began in earnest with its deliberations during the 11th 
Ordinary Summit, held in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, 30 June to 2 July 2008. 
That was after a disputed election in Zimbabwe on 29 March and a very 
violent presidential run-off on 27th June, which forced the competitor, Morgan 
Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) into withdrawing 
so that President Mugabe then ‘won with an 85%’ result (Ploch 2009a:1–4; ZESN 
2008:38, 49, 56–58). With observer teams from SADC, the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum, and the AU in the country, all condemning the violent election and 
submitting unanimous reports to the AU Summit, the body refused to recognise 
the violent presidential results.
However, the 2008 ‘harmonised elections’ in Zimbabwe followed a protracted 
internal political crisis that had dimensions of external, particularly former 
colonial, power: Britain and other Western interests having sought to dislodge 
the former liberation movement and ruling party, ZANU (PF), and President 
Robert Mugabe. Hence, while condemning the documented state-sponsored 
violence that had defied the holding of a free and fair election, the discussion 
document in Sharm El Sheik reveals that the AU was alert to the intersecting 
domestic and international dimensions present in the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe (AU 2008:3).
The manner of intervention to resolve the crisis for the AU was firstly to seize 
ownership by simply making the issue an AU agenda item. This then crowded 
out any other players with different interests and capacities and signalled to 
the parties in conflict that the AU was the convener, arbiter and final source 
of legitimacy for any political institutions that were to function in Zimbabwe. 
Before the AU ‘directly adopted’ the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis, 
attempts had been made to have the documented human rights violations 
become a United Nations Security Council item, a process that was halted by 
Russian and Chinese intervention in New York, arguing that the crisis did not 
amount to a threat to international security.
Secondly, the AU demonstrated that it would exercise its mandate through the 
sub-regional body, ‘urging SADC to establish a mechanism on the ground in 
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order to seize the momentum for a negotiated solution’. Third, the AU was 
explicit in corralling both leading contenders to commit themselves to the 
process by ‘encouraging Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and opposition 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai to honor their commitment to initiate dialogue with 
a view to promoting peace, stability, democracy and reconciliation’ (Global 
Political Agreement 2008). Finally, the AU provided the framework of its 
methodology as the instrument to occupy the political vacuum during the 
transition. It ‘also expressed support to the call for the creation of a government 
of national unity with a clear mandate on three critical areas: exercised shared 
political authority between the president and prime minister and in the process 
pacify extreme tendencies and views; provide the GNU with the task of drafting 
a new constitution and finally, undertake critical legal and institutional reforms 
before a free-and-fair election is held’ (Global Political Agreement 2008). 
The intervention by the AU in the political crisis that had gripped Zimbabwe 
in 2008 decisively removed any doubts amongst ordinary Zimbabweans. It was 
clear that, on the one hand, the country’s political elite, who had sought to use 
violence and a partisan military to seize power, had been brought into the power-
sharing transitional fold (Ploch 2009b), and that, on the other hand, the political 
opposition – perceived to enjoy Western support although appearing to be the 
aggrieved party in the stolen election – the SADC region and the international 
community had to provide the mechanism and road map to resolve the 
political impasse.  
Based on the above, SADC, working through its appointed facilitator, the South 
African President, reporting to the Troika on Politics, Defence and Security 
as well as Summits, has since been seized with attempts to compel reluctant 
political actors who signed the GPA to fully implement its provisions before 
free and fair elections are hosted. At the time of writing, the initial two-year 
transitional period that began in February 2009 has stretched to more than 
36 months, but the basic formula as defined by the AU is still being followed 
although not yet complete.
Without passing judgement on a conflict whose defined road map has still 
not been completed, it is clear that in the case of the 2008 Zimbabwe crisis, 
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the AU’s decisive action and recognised and respected methodology have been 
able to stabilise the situation, pacifying restive international and domestic actors 
who were losing confidence in Zimbabwe’s democracy and the rule of law. The 
intervention has also given the sub-region, SADC, sufficient muscle to act in 
a context that would have been almost impossible to engage as parties have, 
without success, tried to use the sovereignty cover to shut out participation by 
other member states. This was the case when President Robert Mugabe addressed 
the 88th Congress of ZANU (PF)’s Central Committee meeting during which he 
tried to re-interpret the AU resolution and the facilitator’s mandate on 31 March 
2012. All this has been overcome, simply by the position adopted by the AU in its 
wide-ranging resolution on Zimbabwe.
Ivory Coast
Against a background of a protracted conflict between President Laurent 
Gbagbo and his northern adversary, Allasane Ouattara, each complete with a 
pliant armed group who had refused to demobilise, the election of 28 November 
2010 was now subject to certification by the UN. When a dispute arose, the 
UN, supported by the sub-regional body, ECOWAS, certified that Ouattara had 
won the election and should take over the presidency. The AU supported this 
position. Member states were however, divided, with Angola, Chad, Uganda, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea and South 
Africa deviating from the AU-ECOWAS position and siding with Gbagbo or at 
least a negotiated power-sharing agreement. Meanwhile, the regional hegemon, 
Nigeria, adopted a militant position, and prepared to deploy military forces to 
remove Laurent Gbagbo from office. This approach was supported by UNSC 
Resolution 1975 and by France, a country that already had forces in the country 
following earlier UN Peacekeeping Missions’ arrangements. 
Faced with intransigence from Gbagbo, a military solution eventually became 
a reality with Ouattara’s forces marching from the North, supported by French 
air cover and limited ground forces, resulting in the routing of Laurent’s forces 
and his humiliating capture (Zounmenou 2011). Ouattara was then installed as 
the new President. 
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However, this was unlikely to be a panacea. Both Ouattara and Gbagbo had 
become so identified with the factional nature of the crisis and the institutions 
and regional support they drew that neither could be seen as able and capable to 
wield the country back into stability. What many have argued for is a transitional 
authority and period of reconciliation that might allow deep-seated sentiments 
to emerge rather than the rough and ready military victory that we witnessed, 
bringing Ouattara to power, complete with a French contingent guarding him 
all the time. The AU may seek to continue to maintain a close watch on that 
country, as this research has shown a number of pointers towards the resumption 
of conflict. First, the Ivory Coast’s protracted conflict had left the country 
divided between north and south on economic lines, based on a perception 
of foreigners who had appropriated the best lands and are now central to the 
cocoa production. The country was and continues to be split on religious lines, 
with the North seen as Islamic and the South as Christian – a phenomenon that 
is also present, at least in the perception of neighbouring states’ support. To 
this end, support for Ouattara by the Christian Nigerian President, Goodluck 
Jonathan, was seen as coming at a time when the latter was desperate to placate 
and muster the Moslem vote in order to retain his stay in office. 
The preliminary evaluation of Ouattara’s rule is that the country has refused 
to be pacified and conflict drivers are not far from the surface. If these are not 
attended to soon, Ivory Coast is likely to go into convulsion within the next 
five years.
Libya
As we have tried to show, when what is now called the Western consensus 
became the driving force behind economic structural adjustment and nuanced 
democratisation in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, 
the oil-producing Arab states in North Africa, under decades of monarchical 
rule by families and militaries, remained largely untouched. An international 
conspiracy had fashioned different roles for different regions. However, when 
in December 2010, a destitute student in Tunisia, Aziz Bouziz, set himself 
on fire in frustration after being spat on by a police officer, his action set the 
region ablaze. By 2011, Libya was gripped in the wave of the Arab Uprising that 
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began in Tunisia, toppled the Mubarak regime in Cairo, Egypt, in 18 days, and 
later influenced dissent in Benghazi against the 42 year-old rule by Colonel 
Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi. Witnessing the riots on the 
streets, Gaddafi responded by calling for a ‘house-to-house search in order to 
vanquish the rats’. The call was a prelude to launching a vicious military attack 
on the population in a development that soon forced the world to consider 
action in protecting civilians. However, it was the competing regional block, the 
Arab League, that first took the decision to act against Gaddafi in support of 
the civilians, which formed the basis of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 
on Libya (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2011). The 
latter, UNSC resolution 1973, which authorised ‘all measures necessary, offered 
protection of civilians, an oil embargo as well as imposition of a no-fly zone,’ was 
supported by South Africa (Adebajo and Paterson 2011:29;1 Kornegay 2011). 
A coalition of the willing was invited to come together and confront the Libyan 
armed forces and impose the will of the UN in assistance with the opposition, 
organised as the National Transitional Council (NTC). However, as it later 
turned out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), particularly Britain 
and France, used Resolution 1973 as licence for open regime change. Because 
of this, participation by the AU was subject to seeking permission to enter the 
region and Libya from NATO, leading the military operation. The AU publicly 
condemned the ‘one sided interpretation of the Libyan resolution’ passed by 
the UNSC, including South Africa, a non-veto power that had participated in 
the passing of Resolution 1973 and the obvious ‘marginalisation of the AU in 
the management of the Libyan conflict’ (Rizvi 2011). In spite of the obvious 
limitations, the AU, between 10 and 25 May, passed decisions on the Peaceful 
Resolution of the Libyan Crisis in a meeting in Addis Ababa and established 
the High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya with the mandate to establish a 
Road Map (AU 2011: paras. 3, 8). These efforts were later followed up with a 
special summit on 30 June 2011 in Malabo, Guinea-Bissau, when a Draft Road 
Map, Ceasefire, Transitional Government and Elections strategy was suggested 
as constituting the ‘African solution’ to the Libyan crisis. The Foreign Minister 
1 See sections ‘West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire’ (pp.19–21), ‘The Horn of Africa: Somalia, Darfur 
and South Sudan’ (pp. 25–28), and ‘North Africa: Libya and the “Arab Spring”’ (pp. 29–32).
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attending the Malabo summit rejected the offer, however, and by 1 July, credible 
reports emerged of Gaddafi’s role in blocking movement on the AU resolutions 
(Voice of America 2011).2 Meanwhile, the NTC was also being supported by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which now sought the arrest of Gaddafi, 
his son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and the Intelligence Chief for crimes against 
humanity and wilful killing of civilians. Secondly, even where the AU hosted an 
important meeting on Libya in Guinea-Bissau (under the Chairpersonship of 
the Guinea-Bissau President), Col Gaddafi and his ministers refused to adopt 
the AU position and methodology as outlined. Over the next seven months, 
a bitter civil war was prosecuted, ending in August 2011 with the defeat and 
public assassination of Gaddafi.  Again the AU demonstrated lack of policy 
cohesion when the incoming NTC was recognised by 17 African member states – 
significantly including Nigeria and Ethiopia, the seat of the AU – at a time when 
the continental body was still to move from non-recognition of unelected and 
unconstitutional changes of regimes. Confronted with the popular changes of 
power in the Arab Uprising states, this AU protocol now appears archaic and 
highly conservative and must be urgently reviewed.3
The Libyan experience, in which the AU was first shielded from undertaking a 
much more neutral role by the Arab League and the UNSC, demonstrates the 
challenges faced by the continental body in its attempts to be relevant within a 
highly competitive international security framework.
However, this type of international double standard, characterised by actors 
in pursuing hidden and undeclared agendas in their participation in African 
conflicts, should inspire the continental body to try to quickly insulate external 
interests and influence once a conflict breaks. Secondly, the rule by Gaddafi 
for over 42 years and the collusion of the oil-consuming countries in allowing 
long periods of dictatorial misrule of societies in the Arab oil-producing states, 
including those in North Africa, are also to be condemned. Third, Gaddafi and 
his senior ministers ignored the AU intervention, making it impossible for the 
continental body to remain relevant in the crisis. As a result of its lack of leverage 
2 See also reports by the same broadcaster, 11 April: Gadhafi accepts AU Road Map. 
3 Cf. Tostevin 2011.
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with Gaddafi and his regime, the AU and its recommendations were simply 
brushed aside as NATO and leading powers in the UNSC created the solution 
via the NTC that, even as we write, has not brought complete peace and unity in 
Libya. Furthermore, it is also true that the sharp racial and ethnic divide between 
North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, artificial as it seems, was emphasised and 
reinforced by the Libyan crisis. 
The African Union, just as the Arab league, was in support of the UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 … the UN Security Council, 
did not expressly detail the mode of operation of Resolution 1973. NATO’s 
interpretation of protection of civilians also includes bombing of Gaddafi’s 
military depots and communication infrastructure; while France resorts to 
arming the insurgents who have decided to fight all the way to Tripoli … . A 
number of countries that initially supported the resolution, including South 
Africa, took issue with this, insisting that it was outside the parameters of 
the Resolution, and effectively constituted facilitating a regime change in 
Libya (Reuters News Agency 2011).
Next, even as the AU tried to present a united front, when faced, after 7 months 
of fighting, with the question of recognition of the NATO-inspired NTC, 17 
African countries, including Ethiopia and Nigeria, broke ranks with the AU 
position and recognised the new government – closing the sorry AU chapter of 
participation in the Libyan crisis. Finally, the question of the ICC operations on 
the continent and the response by the AU have become mired in controversy, 
acrimony and recriminations. In the case of the Sudanese leader, Al Bashir, 
the AU has passed a resolution calling on African member states to ignore 
the call by the ICC to arrest him. In the case of Libya, the AU’s reconciliation-
seeking methodology and intervention also came up against the ICC calls and 
international arrest warrants on Gaddafi, his son Saif and his Intelligence Chief. 
This further undermined the AU and resulted in the hardening of positions by 
those targeted. The same quandary now appears to face the NTC in power in 
Tripoli, as they are uncertain on whether or not they can be viewed as lacking 
sovereignty and as unpatriotic Western lackeys if they allow Saif to be tried by 




The increasingly assertive AU has begun to flex its muscles in its latest intervention 
in the Sudanese conflict between Khartoum and Juba after the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 eventually resulted in the creation of a new state 
of South Sudan on 9 July 2011. Months into the establishment of the two-states 
solution, fighting has erupted yet again following the occupation of the disputed 
Heglig oil-producing town located on the border with the two. Heglig produces 
about 75% of Sudan’s oil at the moment, quantities that represent over 98% of 
state revenues. Threatened with the disintegration of the new state and outbreak 
of yet again protracted war in the Sudan, the AU launched itself into the matter, 
positioning itself above the two states.
Clear on how the parties are known for their reluctance to engage in negotiating 
talks unless coerced and compelled, the first shots that were fired by the AU 
was through issuing an ultimatum, compelling both states to reach a negotiated 
agreement within three months from 25 April 2012. Continued fighting in 
the Sudan has caused the AU and other international bodies to step in and 
be responsible for huge humanitarian concerns while the political elite and 
militaries continued to fight. Next, in a demonstration of ‘ownership’ of the 
resolution of the crisis, the AU submitted its 7 Point Plan for adoption by the 
UNSC, specifically and significantly securing the endorsement of the USA and 
China, under Article 41 of the UN Chapter 7, which will allow the UN to impose 
sanctions if the deadline is not respected. The UNSC has since voted in favour 
of the AU Road Map and time lines, compelling the two parties to stop fighting 
and return to the negotiating table within the stipulated time if they are to avoid 
automatic sanctions (Chicago Tribune 2012).
Significantly, at the height of the conflict, the South Sudanese leader, President 
Salvir Kirr, undertook an official visit to Beijing, China, a country that is already 
working very closely with President Al Bashir in North Sudan. During the visit, 
Kirr has been able to secure a US$ 8 billion loan to build hydro-electric dams, 
roads, hospitals in most of the provinces and 5 universities, and to fund other 
development programmes. This demonstrates the extent of the involvement and 
leverage of the Chinese in the South Sudanese economy and political decision 
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making. Recovery of the loans is obviously based on expected oil revenue in the 
future (Sudan Tribune 2012). The history of the US as part of the key players 
that propelled the adoption and implementation of the CPA of 2005 has been 
well documented. Moving in a fast-forward mode to April–May 2012, the AU’s 
strategic positioning on the resolution of the crisis in Sudan becomes apparent. 
Addis has taken effective steps to own the process and remain the sole arbiter 
and has appropriated to itself the certification of when and how the crisis 
is ended.
The 7 Point Plan conforms, almost to the letter, to the model and methodology 
that have been cited and are now becoming typical of the AU approach: a holding 
ceasefire, a negotiated settlement, a transitional period during which a Road 
Map is agreed upon – in this case led by the AU High-Level Implementation 
Panel (AUHIP) chaired by South African former President Thabo Mbeki.
This is creative and innovative, leveraging the highest international security 
system body to publicly endorse while subordinating itself to the primacy of 
the African solutions crafted in Addis Ababa – that has a moral and political 
legitimacy superior to that of two sovereign member states. This is unprecedented 
and must be recognised for its innovation. Furthermore, there is a history of 
international interests and super-power involvement in the Sudanese conflict as 
a result of race, ethnicity, regionalism, commercial oil interests and geo-political 
consideration – as conceived from the perspectives of the Arab League and 
the AU.
There has been surprising reaction to the action by the AU. South Sudan is calling 
for their crisis to be resolved through IGAD and not through the ‘seemingly 
biased AU’, as revealed in an address by Pagan Amum, Secretary-General of 
the SPLA/SPLM, at Chatham House in London, on 1 May 2012. Meanwhile, 
Khartoum has rejected this preference to submit the issue to IGAD while still 
being reluctant to follow the AU route. In their opinion, IGAD, where Uganda is 
a member, includes countries that have openly sided with South Sudan and are 
prepared to do more with South Sudan in continuing the war mongering.
Meanwhile, IGAD itself is wracked with internal and regional conflict. While 
North and South Sudan are engaged in heightened conflict and war, Ethiopia 
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and Eritrea are in the same category, which rules out four members of a seven-
member organisation from attending normal sittings while they concentrate 
on internal security situations. Of the other IGAD members (Djibouti, Kenya, 
Somalia and Uganda), Somalia is a collapsed state, the only one on the continent. 
It should be added, however, that a recent Somali Conference hosted in London 
(March 2012) has sought to act as a precursor to the revival of a new state. 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and, more recently, Kenya have deployed troops in 
Somalia in an attempt to root out the al-Shabaab, a previous youth wing of 
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was dismantled by military action about 
half a decade ago. Such a sub-regional body is obviously not organised to offer 
mediation and negotiation services to the war situation that has emerged in 
the Sudan.
Analysis – Is the methodology working?
Over ten years, the AU Peace and Security Council has emerged as a decisive 
international and continental player. It has employed a methodology that 
has developed through trial and error, a mechanism that has been challenged 
not only by the UNSC (Resolution 1973) but even by member states on the 
continent. In this way the AU has managed to wield its accrued political 
legitimacy and authority, on behalf of ordinary Africans, to enforce stability, the 
rule of law and relative economic activity in cases of extreme political collapse 
and fragility. In Libya, the mechanism was unable to work as outside interests 
preferred to work with the Arab League while marginalising and excluding the 
AU from being part of the conflict management and resolution matrix. Today, 
challenges of political stability in Libya, Egypt and their over-flow into Mali, 
Niger, Mauritania, Chad and even Sudan have been left in the lap of the AU 
to react to. Meanwhile, the unprecedented but direct challenge to the Sudanese 
states in Juba and Khartoum has shown a confidence amongst officials at the 
AU that is refreshing. Not only has the AU ring-fenced the resolution of that 
conflict within the ‘African Solutions’ genre, but this also comes at a critical 
time for the organisation’s leadership. The AU Commissioner, Dr Jean Ping, is 
in the throes of fighting for his tenure of office, challenged by South African Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, representing SADC who have expressed a desire to 
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lead the continental organisation for the first time. In the January Summit in 
Addis Ababa, the voting for the Commissioner’s post was inconclusive and this 
has now been set aside – after a series of inconclusive meetings in Benin and 
elsewhere – for resolution at the June Summit in Lilongwe, Malawi. Certainly 
the working relationship between the Commissioner and the Commissioner, 
Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, has provided clarity and 
integrity that has won the respect of allies and foes in the international security 
system. The threat remains at home, around the potential negative reaction by 
political elites in charge of the different member states on the continent.
The point is therefore this, the AU officials adopted a high profile and challenged 
member states politically at a time when the latter may decide to water down 
and reduce the officials to mere spectators in the ensuing power struggle. Africa 
and the AU Peace and Security agenda stand at the cross-roads. This is a reality 
that would take conflict resolution on the continent back to the period before 
the 1997 adoption of the Harare Declaration on unconstitutional changes of 
government. It is also true that Africa still has potential conflict states, where 
long-serving leaders have to create adequate safeguards through credible 
institutions before undertaking free and fair elections to usher in democratic 
governments. Without this in place, the AU has to continue to be on standby 
as we have recommended in the Ivory Coast case study. But who are some of 
the states likely to implode if care is not taken to cajole the leaders to undertake 
rapid and long-term transformation in order for the continent to overcome the 
hiccups of 1989 and join the Fourth Wave of Democratisation when it comes? 
In the context of this research and the type of methodology and mechanism 
for conflict resolution reviewed, the fragile democracies in Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Central African Republic, Chad and Togo may be considered as 
countries that require active encouragement to build credible institutions now 
and in the future in order to avoid falling into the collapsed state situation as we 
have noted in Somalia. 
Conclusions
In 1989, 47 Sub-Saharan states attempted to democratise, according to the 
much discredited Washington Consensus, and within five years, 42 had failed. 
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In January 2011, the rest of the continent was spurred by the Arab Uprisings in 
North Africa. Today, Morocco, Libya and Egypt are still mired in deep crises, 
inviting more internal instability that has the capacity to undermine sub-
regional and even continental stability. Africa is faced with the challenge to 
transform from one-party-state to full democratisation, even though this has 
been stifled by external and local political elites since decolonisation in the 60s. 
Now the AU has been established, and has in the last ten years built and refined 
a working methodology for those states failing to make the grade and exposing 
their peoples to machinations and skewed interventions by external forces. This 
is crafted on: 
•	 working through its sub-regional pillars of economic and security structures 
in Southern (SADC), Central (ECCAS), West (ECOWAS) and East Africa 
(IGAD), but with no meaningful representation in North Africa; 
•	 imposing or compelling a ceasefire; 
•	 adopting the primary role as the conflict management and resolution body; 
•	 calling parties to agree to shared political authority during a defined 
transitional period; 
•	 allowing legal and legislative changes; and
•	 bringing about institutional reforms, including drawing up new 
constitutions, before going for free and fair elections the results of which 
have to be officially certified by the AU. 
In practice however, the implementation of the AU methodology and mechanism 
has gone further. In the case of the recent return of conflict in the Sudan, the 
AU – through its Peace and Security department – has compelled the two states 
to reach an agreement within 90 days or face continental and international 
sanctions. This unprecedented action by Addis Ababa has shocked the member 
states and compelled not only the UNSC but also furtive global powers, waiting 
in the wings as spoilers or tacit supporters of a particular side in the conflict, to 
toe the line and fall behind the AU position. To this end, the AU has secured a 
unanimous UNSC Resolution on the Sudan. In Libya, bereft of a sub-regional 
partner and with the international community working through an Arab League 
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resolution, the AU became marginalised and excluded and was unable to impose 
itself as part of the conflict management players. Meanwhile, in Madagascar, 
working with an assertive sub-regional player, SADC, the AU ‘owns’ the process. 
It was able to fend off the ‘recognition’ by France, and even Turkey and Pakistan, 
of the faction of Andry Rajoelina, before humiliating the same in New York, 
during the September 2009 General Assembly Session when he tried to take the 
podium. This was denied at the last minute following the robust intervention 
of Angola on behalf of the SADC-AU Road Map. Within Madagascar, sanctions 
on the 100 members of HAT and Rajoelina and the obvious economic slump 
have forced parliament, the private sector and the now desperate civil servants 
to abandon their reluctance and begin implementing the SADC-AU Road 
Map to democracy. In Madagascar, the combination of the AU methodology 
and an equally assertive sub-regional body, SADC, looks like it is going to get 
the parties to the fountain of reconciliation, adopt the norms and standards of 
democratisation and achieve a long-term and permanent peace.
A major achievement for the AU has also been the rejection of the Malian rebels – 
the Touaregs and Salafists, coming from Libya, well armed beyond the capacity of 
the local forces – who had captured and invested almost 80% of the country and 
declared large swathes independent and now part of the new state of Azawad. 
While the government was fighting off a military coup in Bamako, it was only 
the AU’s explicit and immediate rejection of the balkanisation of Mali that 
stopped a number of countries and actors in the shadows that were on the verge 
of recognising the fast moving rebel movement. This has not been confronted 
by the local, disintegrating army to date. However, the point has remained valid, 
and the AU’s call has been honoured, forcing the militarily strong Touaregs to 
consider entering into a dialogue. This represents the epitome and triumph of 
the AU intervention in African conflict resolution.
However, while the AU has fashioned an instrument that has international 
credibility and integrity, the danger is that this is led by officials who may or 
may not be around or at the helm for long. For example, the AU Commissioner, 
Dr Jean Ping, has had his ability to function seriously curtailed when he failed to 
win re-election during the January Summit when challenged by South African 
Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a candidate put forward by SADC, a region 
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seeking to occupy the top seat for the first time. Hence, the good work of the Peace 
and Security Commissioner, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, is threatened by 
the organisational hierarchical changes. Apart from this paper raising awareness 
of the developing and evolving trends, it also has provided a sense of which 
countries may or may not be part of the Fourth Wave of Democratisation, given 
the absence of predictable and sustainable democratic institutions in a number 
of African countries that must be now on the watch-list of those interested in the 
larger stabilisation of the African democratic agenda.
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